The Critique of Conceiving Logic as a Propadeutic :: Logic Ontology Philosophy Essays

The survey of Conceiving Logic as a Propadeutic Introduction Does system of logical system assume an ontology? What is the relationship between logic and ontology? In contemporary philosophy common answers have been No to the first and none to the second question. This is because the principles of logic, to borrow Kantian terminology, argon understood as regulative rather than organic(prenominal) of objects. For a principle to be regulative centre that it provides us with a methodology that belongs somehow to the nature of our thinking, but not to that of the world, as constitutive principles do.i In this way, a regulative conception of logic represents logic as an instrument of intellect that takes for granted a ball set of rules, rules which have no bearing on reality and that are invented as tools to guide our thought.ii It is no curiosity that as a firmness most contemporary logic text-books present logic as imposing or informal system of rules meant to r egulate our thinking. But why should we conjecture that logic is a regulative instrument devoid of ontological post? The aim here is to show that this presupposition regarding the nature of logic has very elegant grounds and that a more plausible conception is a constitutive one, where logic is seen to express the structure of the world as mathematics might. This exit be argued first by articulating Kants arguments for the separation of logic and ontology found on his criticism of pure reason and logic as providing principles constitutive of objects. Next, a Hegelian criticism of this criticism leave be provided, as a defence of pure reason, to present subsequently his conception of reason and logic as the fountain of constitutive principles. This will be attempt by showing (a) Hegels conception of logic, (b) of thought, and (c) of objective thought. Finally, this position will be challenged with the charge of psychologism to show that nonetheless an ontological v iew of logic is more plausible than a regulative one. I. Kant Finite Experience and The Critique Of Pure Reason 1.1. The Regulative Logical Employment of Reason Kants first Critique is an impressive analysis of the theoretical mind, an attempt to disclose its nature, capacity for knowledge, and limits.